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NOTES
VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE: AN ADJUNCT TO THE
MANDATORY PROCESSES
Largely because of its immense statutory role, the Federal Trade
Commission has, since its inception, been faced with the problem of
evolving an effective guidance program. Though the merits and function of the mandatory phase of the FTC's overall compliance program
will be briefly reviewed in this note, the primary question to be considered is the significance and role of the voluntary compliance program
in the overall guidance program. To what extent do and should industry guides, trade practice conference rules, advisory opinions and trade
regulation rules-the voluntary compliance measures-assist the FTC
in fulfilling its statutory objectives?
I.

INTRODUCTION

The FTC is charged with the responsibility for administering and
enforcing laws dealing with restraints of trade, tendencies toward monopoly, unfair trade practices and consumer protection.' It seeks to protect competition in our private enterprise economy, and to this end the
Commission is directed to prevent practices harmful to both competitors
and consumers2 when the public interest is involved.' Even a cursory
analysis of the FTC's statutory functions demonstrates the great scope

of its activities.
1. In the main the FTC exercises responsibilities under the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 717 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1958) ; Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1958); Webb-Pomerene
Export Trade Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918); 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1958); Wool Products
Labeling Act of 1939, 54 Stat. 1128 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 68 (1958) ; 59 Stat. 33 (1945),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958); Lanham Trade Mark Act, 60 Stat. 427 (1946), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1051-72, 1091-96, 1111-27 (1958); Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 111 (1953),
15 U.S.C. §§ 1191-1200 (1958); Textile Fiber Products Identification Act, 72 Stat.
1717 (1958), 15 U.S.C. § 70 (1958). Chiefly, however, the Commission is concerned
with the FTC Act, as amended, the Clayton Antitrust Act, as amended, and a few of
the acts dealing with tex-tiles and furs. Consideration of the administration and enforcement of the statutes pertaining to textiles and furs is beyond the scope of this note.
2. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 9. See Note, Trade Rides and Trade Conferences: The
FTC and Business Attack Deceptive Practices,Unfair Competition, and Antitrust Violatio , 62 YALE L.J. 912 (1953), where it is indicated that the FTC was originally to
protect competitors and to preclude further growth of monopoly.
3. "The Commission acts only in the public interest, and it does not take action
when the alleged violation of law is merely a matter of private controversy and does not
tend adversely to affect the public." FTC Rules of Practice § 1.21, 27 Fed. Reg. 4610
(1962).
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Conceived in 1914 to provide business with greater certainty as to
the lines of legitimate conduct and to forestall developed trade restrictions, the FTC's principal efforts were to be prophylactic, rather than
directed at penalizing offenders for wrongful acts previously committed.In a revaluation of the FTC the 1949 Hoover Commission Task Force
Report stated that it:
[R]epresents not a departure from reliance on free competition, but an effort to maintain effective competitive conditions
by preventing the development of monopolistic and restrictive
practices. By continuous, expert attention, it was expected to
adapt and apply the general terms of the statutes to current
business practices to make their enforcement more effective,
and to build up a body of precedents to govern business conduct.5 (Emphasis added.)
From the beginning the FTC was to educate the country, particularly the
business community, through interpretative and regulatory activity.'
Those who established the FTC believed that businessmen need and
are entitled to guidance which they can comprehend and apply in their
daily business operations. Absent such advice businessmen must turn
for guidance to legal practitioners and to antitrust specialists, who themselves are frequently without adequate bases for interpreting the antitrust laws in terms of specific business situations.' Despite the original
purpose of the 1914 laws, they are couched in general terms. The FTC
4. In his famous dissent in FTC v. Gratp, Mr. Justice Brandeis outlined the reasons for establishing the FTC.
[T]he act undertook to preserve competition through supervisory action of the
Commission. The potency of accomplished facts had already been demonstrated.
The task of the Commission was to protect competitive business from further
inroads -by monopoly. It was to be ever vigilant. If it discovered that any
business concern had used any practice which would be likely to result in public
injury-because in its nature it would tend to aid or develop into a restraint of
trade---the Commission was directed to intervene, before any act should be done
or condition arise violative of the Anti-Trust Act. . . . Its purpose in respect
to restraints of trade was prevention of diseased business conditions, not cure.
253 U.S. 421, 435 (1920). For an excellent and exhaustive study of the origin and early
development of the FTC see HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COIMISSION (1924).
5.

U.S. COMM'N ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANcH OF THE GOVERN-

MENT, TAsK FORcE REP. ON REGULATORY COMMISsIoNs [hereinafter cited as HoovER

RE,.1 App. N 119 (1949).
6. See VAN CIsE & DUNN, How TO COMPLY WITH ANTITRUST LAWS 25 (1954).
7. The interpretation and administration of the Antitrust Laws are so lacking
in consistent clear standards related to practical performance that no businessman can tell whether or not he is conforming with or violating the spirit and
intent of the various statutes. The businessman's lawyer cannot give reliable
guidance.
McCracken, The Federal Antitrust Laws from the Viewpoint of a Business Lawyer,
CCH ANTITRUST LAW Symxp. 85, 86 (1953).
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Act overlaps the Sherman Act, and the Clayton Act contains sanctions
additional to the FTC's preventive orders. The danger presented to the
businessman is obvious. If he acts, and it is later determined that the
practice or act is unlawful, enormous loss to the enterprise could result.
Reason and experience dictate that those affected by the laws enforced
by the FTC should be relieved insofar as possible of uncertainties with
regard "to their enterprises and investments and a clear path indicated
which they can travel without anxiety."'
It is quite obvious, however, that neither statutes nor the FTC provide an exact answer for every business situation, nor could either define
with precision the definite bounds within which all acts would be legitimate. Instead, the FTC must strive to prescribe guidelines which are
as specific as possible in order to enable the businessman to reasonably
determine what conduct falls within the condemnation of the law. As
the late justice Brandeis remarked:
If you ask me how near you can walk to the edge of a precipice
without going over, I can't tell you, for you may walk on the
edge, and all of a sudden you may step on a smooth stone, or
strike against a little bit of root sticking out, and you may go
over that precipice. But if you ask me, how near you can go to
the precipice and still be safe, I can tell you, and I can guarantee
that whatever mishap comes to you, you will not fall over that
precipice.9
The proponents of the FTC anticipated that the cease and desist
order would provide this vital guidance to businessmen." Although
orders are based upon previous violations of law, they do not penalize
respondents for past misconduct. Instead they declare "a rule of conduct for the future," the observance of which would avoid any violation
of the law. Under the original FTC Act, an order could not be enforced until it was modified or affirmed by the court. Currently, after
an order to cease and desist becomes final, penalties can be imposed for
subsequent violations. Thus even today the distinction between the traditional court adjudication and the cease and desist order remains in that
S. 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7709-10 (1925). See also address
by Commissioner MacIntyre, before the Winter Conference of the American Marketing Association, in New York, N.Y. Dec. 27, 1961, on file in FTC Library [hereinafter
all speeches are to be deemed on file in the FTC Library unless the contrary is indicated] where it is expressed that the hoped for certainty and flexibility in the antimonopoly laws lie in the guides established by the FTC. Id. p. 27.
9. Statement by Mr. Justice Brandeis before the FTC, April 30, 1915, on file in
the FTC Library.
10.

HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COmmSSION 71-77 (1924).
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the latter can only be applied prospectively." Therefore, since the order
does not have retrospective application, respondent and, indeed, businessmen in general are forewarned to a degree of conduct deemed unlawful.
Limitations on the effectiveness of the order for widespread practices
and frequent inadequacy in drafting orders appear to have led to FTC
reliance upon other guidance measures.
In attempting to provide this guidance to businessmen, the FTC has
emphasized either the mandatory or the voluntary phases of the guidance
program, depending in part on the economic and political viewpoint of
its members.' 2 But regardless of which procedures are emphasized, the
Commission has constantly been pressed to develop a more adequate program of enforcement.

II.

NEED FOR AN ADEQUATE PROGRAM OF GUIDANCE

A. Manpower, Money and Organization. Until recently the Commission's staff was only slightly larger than that of 1918." s Yet there
is little comparison between the magnitude and complexity of the problems facing the FTC today and those with which it was confronted over
forty years ago. Projected increases in the productive capacity of our
economy for 1970 threaten to magnify further the enforcement problems facing the FTC.'4 The staff has been significantly increased in
recent years, but it remains insufficient to handle the task of carefully
considering the applications for complaints submitted by consumers and
competitors of the alleged wrongdoers.' 5 Moreover, if the events of
these years are any indication, further sizeable increases in the staff of
11. 3 TRADE REG. REP. 9661 (1962) ; Freer, Federal Trade Commission Procedure
and Practice, 8 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 316, 330-31 (1939-40).
12. See addresses by Chairmen Kintner and Dixon, 1959-1962, on file in the FTC
Library; 1960-1961 FTC ANN. REP.
13. In 1918 the FTC employed 689 persons, but in 1952 only 657. 1952 FTC ANN.
REP. 10. The 1961 staff totaled 855 persons. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 2. Chairman Dixon
has sought further substantial increases in the authorized FTC staff. Hearing on H.R.
527ii
Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong.,

2d Sess. 976 (1962) [hereinafter cited as r962 Hearings].
14. While in 1914 approximately two million businesses were subject to the FTC's
jurisdiction, 'by 1958 the figure had exceeded four million. Also, the 1914 national
volume of advertising was estimated at $1.3 billion, whereas the figure had climbed to
over $10.2 billion in 1957. Further, the gross national product was only $40 billion in
1914; yet by 1957 the gross national product had increased tenfold to $433 billion.
Hearings on the Investigation of Regulatory Commissions and Agencies Before a Subcommittee of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d

Sess. 99 (1958). By 1970 the gross national product is expected to reach $825 billion.
1962 ANN. REP. OF THE COUNCIL OF EcoNomic ADvisORS 115. (None of the above
figures has been adjusted for change in value of the dollar.)

15. Applications for complaints have increased markedly in recent years: 3,782 in

1958; 4,400 in 1959; 5,930 in 1960; 4,886 in 1961; and 6,900 in 1962.
ANN. REP.; 1962 Hearings 955.

1958-1961 FTC
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the FTC will not adequately resolve the problems of delay and incomplete and piecemeal enforcement which have long troubled the FTC.'
Likewise, there is little reason to believe that substantial increases in budget appropriations would alone materially enhance the enforcement efforts of the FTC." In short, the problem of adequately treating many
of the diverse and complex issues of law confronting the Commission
cannot be stated in terms of money and manpower alone.
From time to time the Commission has reorganized its functions to
expedite and otherwise improve its enforcement operations, but these
realignments have not resolved the basic problem.' 8 It is too early to
determine whether the recent changes made by the FTC will be rewarding or whether, as has been characteristic of previous changes in organization, the main problems of enforcement will remain stubbornly
pervasive."0
Therefore, while the FTC has seriously endeavored to make its
enforcement of antitrust laws more effective through increases in budget
and staff and changes in staff organization, it is not at all apparent that
these measures have led to improved results. These measures have been
aimed principally at improvement of the case-by-case approach to enforcement, which remains to be proved the keystone to effective enforcement.
B. The Case-By-Case Approach to Enforcement. The case-by-case
approach, while indispensable in certain areas, particularly antitrust, has
tL.REGULATION VS.
16. See, e.g., GELLER, ADVERTISING AT THE CROSSROADS: FDmE
VOLUNTARY CONTROL (1952); LANDIS, REPORT ON REGULATORY AGENCIES TO THE PRESIDENT-ELECT (1960) [hereinafter cited as LANDIS REP.]; House Comm. on Small Busi-

ness, Antitrust Law Enforcement by the FTC and the Antitrust Div., Dept. of JusticeA PrelmitharyRep., H.R. Doc. No. 3236, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1951) [hereinafter cited
as PreliminaryRep.]; Hearings on Reorganization Plans Nos. 1, 2, 3 & 4 Before a Subcotinittee of the House Committee on Government Operations,87th Cong., 1st Sess. 50

(1961).
17. Appropriations have increased marketdly in recent years from $6,839,500 in
1960 to $10,345,000 in 1963. In 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 97; 55 BNA ANTITRUST & TADE
A-21 (July 31, 1962). Yet Chairman Dixon recently stated that pending investigations of questionable practices are now equal to about two year's work by the
present staff. 1962 Hearings 955. Comparison of this current backlog with 1949 and
1959 figures reveals that there has not been a significant reduction in the backlog of
investigations despite substantial increases in the staff and funds. STAFF OF SPECIAL
REG. REP.

ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN
SURCOmmiTTEE ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, HOUSE CoiTeA.
CommERCE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMisSION, COMPARATIVE
OPERATING DATE FOR YEARS 1949 AND 1959 111 (SUBCOMMITTEE PRINT 1960). Naturally

the increase in the number of violations, investigations, and orders to cease and desist
which has occurred in the past few years tends to explain the failure of the FTC to
shorten the delay time.

18. See Note, The Federal Trade Commission and Reform of the Administrative
Process, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 671 (1962).
19. See, e.g., 3 TRADE REG. REP. 1 9555 (Oct. 23, 1961); Preliminary Rep. 10; 73
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-11 (Dec. 4, 1962).
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been too heavily relied upon where problems are widespread or industrywide. The shortcomings of this method of enforcement from the standpoint of the FTC, the individual businessman, and the consumer are
numerous: (1) the individual respondent is placed at a disadvantage
vis-A-vis competitors who are often equally as guilty of engaging in unlawful activity; (2) the case-by-case approach is exceedingly time consuming and expensive; (3) it fails to encourage massive compliance;
(4) it operates only after the violation has been committed; (5) only
specific acts are proscribed, causing the law to develop slowly and in
narrowly defined fields;2" and finally (6) it strikes at individual violators and often fails to develop the economic facts necessary to prescription of an adequate remedy.2
The vitality of the case-by-case approach is further weakened by the
FTC's sometimes unfortunate attempt at selection of cases in the public
interest. In the Matter of Gimbel Bros., Inc.,2 2 is an example of adjudication of a matter only slightly in the public interest. In his dissent
Commissioner Elman criticized the Commission for accepting the case,
stating the hearing examiner found that:
Following the publication of this advertisement [the source
of the unlawful conduct], and prior to the issuance of the complaint in this case, respondent tightened its policy rules..
The record shows that respondent has on many occasions conferred with the Federal Trade Commission personnel for interpretations and suggestions, and has always complied with
the suggestions and recommendations received."
Other instances of improper selection of cases could be noted, such as
where orders to cease and desist were issued after the practice had terminated24 or where complaints were issued against firms already out of
20. Certainly the instances when it is desirable or necessary for the law to so develop are to be excluded from this general statement.
21. For a more complete discussion of these shortcomings see generally, Tait,
Equitable Treatment of Competitors, CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYmP. 75 (1960); Prelininary Rep.; HoovER REP.; address by Chairman Dixon, before American Association
of Advertising Agencies, in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., April 28, 1962.
22. 3 TRADE REo. REP.
15748 (1960).
23. Id. at 120571 rn 5.
24. Occasionally such a procedure may be necessary, as where the FTC has reason
to believe that the practice may 'be resumed or' where the offense is so flagrant as to
dictate that some action be taken against the wrongdoer. Interviews (Members of the
staff of the Indiana Law journal gathered information from present and past FTC
personnel and from others expert on the affairs of the FTC in connection with the
preparation of this Note. Authority for information thusly obtained, the source of
which must remain confidential, will hereinafter be cited as Interviews).
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business or persons already deceased.2"
The real difficulty seems to be that the Commission has neglected
to develop an adequate procedure for selection of complaints. While it is
obligated to select those cases most in the public interest26 and to use a
multiplicity of approaches, the FTC has been criticized for merely responding to the applications for complaints.2
It has been contended
with some force that more careful screening of applications at the early
stages would decrease the casework load without reducing the effectiveness of the FTC. 8 Therefore, a partial solution to the problem presented
by the case-by-case approach to enforcement seems to lie in the exercise
of more discretion in the selection of complaints and in a readiness to
forestall proceedings in which the "practice has been abandoned voluntarily or the controversy has in some way become moot."29 Further,
greater emphasis on adjudicatory proceedings for antimonopoly violations and on conciliatory proceedings for minor matters" would appear
to be consonant with the public interest.2 '
Once a practice raising questions of violation has been selected for
consideration by the Commission, an analysis should be made to ascer25. See PreliminaryRep. 17; see also address by Commissioner MacIntyre, op. cit.
supra note 8, p. 11, which pinpoints areas of substantive law where the case-by-case approach has been ineffective; for example, in the purchasing activities of wholesale buying groups in the automotive parts industry, the fictitious pricing and deceptive practices in the watch industry, and the deceptive labeling of the reprocessed motor oils.
26. However, Chairman Dixon recently made a "case" for the "small" case. For
the "antitrust agencies are frequently criticized for peering so intently into mice-holes
that they don't notice when an elephant rumbles by them." Address by Chairman

Dixon, before Section of Antitrust Law, American Bar Association, in San Francisco,
Cal., Aug. 6, 1962, p. 13.
Dixon's retort to this was mainly twofold: (1) "little" cases often involve principles that must be protected for their own sake, and (2) certain offenses are "little"
when first discovered but are in their incipiency and will tend to grow substantially.
Id. p. 14. Clearly the latter reason appears sound on its face, though there could be disagreement in the specific instance concerning the proper approach to compliance. But
the merit in the first point in Dixon's reply is difficult to comprehend; there is little
necessity for protecting a principle for its own sake regardless of how slightly the matter is in the public interest.
27. "It is in the tendency of the regulatory commissions to view themselves as
courts of law that many of their administrative difficulties have their root. It is the
attribute of a court to wait for what the tide brings in." Preliminary Rep. 7.
28. See generally McCracken, supra note 7, at 94; Preliminary Rep. 15-16.
29. HPNDERsoN, THE FEDERAL TRADE CoaIssioN 338 (1924). But see note 24
supra.
30. HoovER REP. 128.
31. Chairman Dixon has referred to the concept of public interest in these terms:
"I believe, in short, that our collective economic and political life depends upon the performance that our economy can deliver in the next few decades, and that the quality of
that national performance, in turn, depends upon creating and maintaining the sharpest
degree of competition in all of our industries." See address by Chairman Dixon, op. cit.
supra note 26, p. 12.
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tain whether the type of violation is isolated or widespread.32 If the
questioned practice is found to be pervasive of an industry or many industries, the Commission must then choose between its voluntary and
mandatory means of coping with it. Assuming for the moment that the
mandatory means are used, the FTC may proceed against the alleged
violators singly 3 or hold the cease and desist proceedings in abeyance"
until respondent's competitors can be proceeded against simultaneously. 5
But it is doubtful that either approach would be effective in many instances. 6 Limited manpower and funds may militate against a multiplicity of cases. And, an adjudication may confine itself only to a precise set of facts, thereby forestalling effective guidance."
Basically, however, two approaches may be followed by the FTC in
handling a complaint selected for adjudication: (1) normal statutory
procedure resulting in issuance of a cease and desist order upon a finding
of violation, or (2) issuance of a consent order. 8 Under the former
procedure the FTC has continually increased its activity so that in 1961
a total of 368 orders to cease and desist were issued in antimonopoly and
deceptive practices cases. 9 Broad discretion has been granted the FTC
in formulating its orders which need not be limited to the specific unlawful practice at hand or to the particular area where the unlawful
practice was discovered." Yet the orders have frequently been found to
provide only limited guidance to businessmen, especially when the orders
are couched in terms of the statute.4 '
In mid-1961 the stipulation to cease and desist procedure was eliminated but the consent procedure was continued.42 The decision whether
to use this voluntary procedure rests with the FTC, and a respondent
must accept the offer to settle a controversy by consent order within a
32. See address by Chairman Dixon, op. cit. supra note 21, p. 8.
33. National Candy Co. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 999 (7th Cir. 1939).
34. Moog Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
35. The announced position of the FTC is industrywide prosecution as opposed to
company-by-company prosecution. 5 TRADE REG. REP. ff 50153 (Oct. 14, 1962); see
address by Chairman Dixon, op. cit. supra note 26, p. 12. But see other student notes
in this symposium for specific examples where this procedure has not been adhered to.
36. See generally Tait, supra note 21, at 76.
37. For detailed analyses see accompanying student notes.
38. 3 TRADE EG. REP. ff 9661 (June 19, 1962); id. ff 9737 (Dec. 18, 1962).
39. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 34. Naturally the complexity of the cases selected for
adjudication causes some variation in the volume of cease and dssist orders issued.
40. FTC v. Mandel Bros., Inc., 359 U.S. 385 (1959) ; Hershey Chocolate Corp. v.
FTC, 121 F.2d 968 (3d Cir. 1941); Maryland Baking Co. v. FTC, 243 F.2d 716 (4th
Cir. 1957) ; Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960).
41. There remain, however, circumstances under which the cease and desist order
is the most effective means of providing adequate guidance to businessmen. See Note,
.this symposium, concerning FTC v. Palmolive-Colgate Co.
42. 3 TRAnE REG. REP. ff 9737 (Dec. 18, 1962).
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short period of time.4" If the FTC and the proposed respondent fail to
agree on a consent order, a complaint is issued and the consent procedure
is thereafter unavailable, resulting in the handling of the matter by regular statutory procedure." The consent order procedure, while it saves
time and money, suffers from the same deficiencies as the ordinary cease
and desist procedure in situations where a practice or act is widespreadlittle guidance is provided.4 5 Its usefulness should not be overlooked
though in areas where the law is settled or where the issues of law in
question are not of sufficient consequence to demand extensive examination by the FTC.
On one point the authorities appear to be in harmony-the mandatory approach to enforcement alone is generally inadequate." The conflict comes in deciding which and to what extent other procedures should
be utilized in achieving the enforcement goals laid down for the FTC.
Where unlawful practices are widespread, it seems clear that voluntary
procedures hold the key to the development of a well rounded program
of guidance. Therefore, the remainder of this note is devoted to determining the proper role of the existing voluntary compliance mechanisms-trade practice conference rules, guides, advisory opinions and
trade regulation rules."
III.

VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES

The voluntary compliance program is designed to provide the businessman and the public with guidance so that through voluntary industrywide observance of the law the "competitive inequities are minimized"
and the "consumers are benefited by the elimination of unfair practices."'" Unquestionably these voluntary measures serve the public interest, provide the preventative advice considered so vital by former
President Wilson45 and the other founders of the agency, eliminate the
inequities of proceeding against selected individual violators, and over43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. 5 TRADE PE-.REP. fI 50104 (Oct. 23, 1961).
46. See, e.g., HoovER REP.; LANDIS REP.; Preliminary Rep.; address by Chairman Dixon before the National Association of Better Business Bureaus, Phoenix, Ariz.,
May 9, 1961; address by Commissioner Elman, before the the First Annual Corporate
Oct. 11, 1962; address by former Chairman Kintner,
Counsel Institute, Chicago, Ill.,
before a Consumer Conference at Geneva College, Beaver Falls, Penn., April 14, 1961.
47. Yet it must be emphasized continually that even the most adamant exponents
of the voluntary enforcement program acknowledge that thorough and vigorous use of
the mandatory procedures is the backbone of a successful voluntary compliance program. See Kintner, The FTC in 196--Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, CCH ANTITRUST
LAW SymP. 21 (1961).
48. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 63.
49. 16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 7916 (1925).
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come most of the shortcomings generally found in the case-by-case enforcement method. To more clearly demonstrate the role of the voluntary compliance program, it is necessary to define each of the voluntary
compliance procedures more precisely.5"
A. Trade Practice Conference (TPC). The basic purpose of the
trade practice conference-the voluntary procedure first developed by
the FTC -- is to eliminate and prevent, on a voluntary and industrywide
basis, the illegal practices and acts which are violative of laws administered by the FTC. 2 It is the policy of the Commission to use the TPC
procedure
[T]o encourage widespread observance of the law by enlisting
cooperation of members of industries and informing them more
fully of the requirements of the law, so that wherever consistently possible the Commission may avoid the need for adversary actions against persons who, through misunderstanding
or carelessness, may violate the law unintentionally.
1. Procedure. Under the above stated policy, proceedings for conferences may originate with industry or consumer application or upon
motion of the Commission itself, 4 but generally the request comes at the
50. The Commission has indicated that it follows no standardized rules for determining whether to utilize the guides, the trade practice conference rules, or the trade
regulation rules to handle a matter. Instead, it makes the selection of a voluntary procedure on an ad hoc basis after a thorough review of the nature and the extent of the
unlawful condition. Letter from Bryan H. Jacques, Director, Bureau of Guidance, to
Indiana Law Journal, Dec. 10, 1962.
This method of selection seems realistic and desirable, as it is doubtful that workable and flexible rules could be devised to enable the Commission to more mechanistically choose a voluntary procedure for a given situation. Consequently, the analysis of
the voluntary enforcement procedures will be made on an individual basis in an effort
to ascertain the potential of each procedure and the extent to which the potential has
been realized. Little attempt will be made to illustrate where the FTC might have
selected an alternate voluntary procedure.
51. The first set of rules was promulgated in 1919 as a result of widespread
charges concerning the working of gold shell, and gold plated and gold filled finger
rings. Kittelle & Mostow, A Review of the Trade Practice Conferences of the Federal
Trade Commission, 8 GEo. WAsii. L. REv. 427, 429 (1940). This rule marked the beginning of the trade practice submittal which was employed where large numbers of
complaints came to the attention of the FTC respecting a practice generally prevalent
in an industry. 1920 FTC ANN. REP. 43, 44. The marked success of this program
necessitated the creation in 1926 of a separate division, the Division of Trade Practice
Conferences.

1926 FTC ANN. REP. 49.

52. 12 Fed. Reg. 5811 (1947).
53. Ibid.
54. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.21, 27 Fed. Reg. 4511 (1962). But prior to FTC
reorganization in 1946 and issuance of a policy statement respecting trade practice conferences in 1947, conferences were generally initiated upon the application of industry.
See 1947 FTC ANN. REP. 3; 12 Fed. Reg. 5811 (1947).

SYMPOSIUM

behest of industry." If the conference is considered to have a possibility
of constructively advancing the industry or bringing about more equitable
adherence to the laws or is otherwise in the public interest, it will be
authorized by the Commission." Extreme caution is exercised to avoid
furthering trends toward illegal collusion or combination, and to this end
the Conference Division requests informal clearance for the conference
from the Justice Department and all interested divisions of the FTC."
After the FTC has prepared tentative industry rules, 8 the conference is
held and a full and frank discussion of questionable trade practices present in an industry may ensue. 9 Following the conference and on the
basis of information accumulated to that time, a draft of proposed rules
is prepared and submitted to the Commission together with any resolutions or amendments.6" A public hearing on the proposed rules is then
held by the FTC, at which time "industry members and all other interested parties, including consumers, may appear and express their views." 1
Upon final approval of the rules by the Commission, promulgation is
made in the Federal Register and distribution is made to all industry
55.

56.

See 1958-1961 FTC ANN. REP.

4

TRADE REG. REP. f140110

(March 4, 1963).

Subsequently, a time and place

for the conference are announced in the Federal Register.
In setting up the conference, the FTC gives assurance that at the conference charges
will not be brought against particular members of the industry. ATr'Y. GEN. CoMM. ON

ADiINISTM.TIVE PROCEDURE, Monograph No. 6, 70 (1940).
57. Note, Trade Rules and Trade Conferences: The FTC and Business Attack

Deceptive Practices, Unfair Competition, and Antitrust Violations, 62 YALE L.J. 912, 92223 (1953).
58. Fundamentally, trade practice rules are divided into two categories, Group I
and Group II. 4 TRADE REG. REP. ff 40040 (March 4, 1963). Group I rules relate to
practices violative of the law and are based on decisions of the Commission and the
courts, and on provisions in and legislative history of the statutes administered by the
FTC. Compliance with these rules is mandatory. On the other hand, Group II rules
contain advice considered conducive to sound and fair business methods and practices,
but such rules must be in consonance with law and the public interest and in support of
fair, competitive conditions of the industry. Compliance is permissive or voluntary;
and the FTC will not intervene because of non-compliance, except where non-compliance
results in unfair methods of competition or unfair or deceptive acts or practices. 16
C.F.R. §§ 17.3, 17.4 (1960).
59. 1962 FTC ANN. RE'. 62. A typical trade practice conference was conducted
for the Wire Rope Industry by Commissioner MacIntyre. Manufacturers, sellers, distributors and fabricators of the industry were given the chance to propose rules aimed
at prevention and elimination of unlawful trade acts and practices. Some of the topics
discussed were sale of raw materials by industry members to other members and sale of
finished products to other purchasers at unjustified price differentials; "misrepresentation (general); substitution of products; misleading price lists; deceptive invoicing;
prohibited sales below cost; inducing breach of contract; prohibited forms of trade restraints; and prohibited discriminatory trade practices." FTC News Summary No. 10,
Feb. 9, 1962, p. 4, col. 2. All but the first of these discussion subjects concern rule
provisions found in a substantial number of the trade practice conference rules in force
for other industries.
60. 4 TRADE REG. R'EP. ff 40110 (March 4, 1963).
61. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.56, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962).
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members. Appeal for amendment may be made by an interested party
at any time.62
2. Program of Observance. After promulgation of the trade practice conference rules for an industry, the FTC examines the allegations
of violation by members of the industry which have not reached the
complaint stage to determine whether the conference rules adequately
cover them. If so, and if the purported violator has subscribed to the
conference rules and is complying with them, the FTC will close the
matter, when such is in the public interest, without prejudice to the right
to reopen whenever warranted. Similarly, where a complaint has been
issued but not adjudicated, a respondent may make a motion to suspend
the proceedings without prejudice to the FTC's right to reopen, but this
procedure is likewise available only where the alleged violation is encompassed by the conference rules and there is reason to believe the
respondent is complying.6"
Trade practice conference rules have no force of law in and of
themselves but are merely advisory in nature.6" The FTC, in filing a
complaint, charges a violation of the applicable statutory provision, but
in cases where courts have considered the applicability of such rules, the
validity of the principles expressed in the rules has been confirmed."
Currently rules administration is handled by the Division of Trade
Practice Conferences and Guides, which operates by maintaining liaison
with members of the industry and their trade associations."6 The division actively engages in furnishing rule interpretations, reviewing complaints and securing effective discontinuance of unlawful practices,67 but
62. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.57, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962) ; 4

lfl 40130, 40140 (March 4, 1963).

TRADE

PEG.

PEP.

63. 1948 FTC ANN. REP. 113. However, it is important that the alleged violator
has signed the "acceptance card," confirming his intention to comply with the conference
rules. See Note, supra note 2, at 931.
With regard to non-compliance with rules against restraints of trade, violations of
the Clayton Act, and conspiracies and monopolistic practices, settlement by voluntary
agreement is not in keeping with the policy of the FTC. 1948 FTC ANN. REP. 116.
64. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.59, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962).
65. See, e.g., where the definitions of certain industry terms for the Masonry
Vaterproofing Industry were accepted and described by the court as being "so precisely
drawn as to avoid any ambiguity," Prima Products, Inc. v. FTC, 209 F.2d 405, 408 (2d
Cir. 1954); and where another court found "that a set of rules worked out in conference between a government agency and an industry can be taken as a guide if, to
those responsible for government, they are reasonable and fair," Northern Feather
Works, Inc. v. FTC, 234 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1956).

66. 1961 FTC ANNx. REP. 64.
In administering the rules, the Division of Trade Practice Conferences and Guides
handled the following matters in an average fiscal year:
57 different industries under rules were visited in the field, involving conferences with over 520 industry members, association executive, and other industry representatives. . . . [T]he Commission wrote to approximately 4,200
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in the end the Commission relies primarily on complaints from the public to discover noncompliance."3 Formal action, however, is not necessarily initiated upon the recommendation of this division.
3. Effectiveness of the Trade Practice Conference. For the most
part the trade practice conference program has had a constructive, if
limited, effect upon business conduct. 9 Generally, industry and critics
have commented favorably on the endeavors of the FTC under this program,7 but the impact of the program on competitive conduct has always been difficult to assess. As stated by Kittelle and Mostow:
Technically and theoretically, the conference rules are unnecessary, for there is no violation of law prohibited by them that
is not already covered by statute, and no different or more
expeditious procedure is available for enforcing the one than
the other. Practically, however, trade practice conferences
have unquestionably had moral effect in bringing the law, and a
knowledge of the existence and functions of the Commission,
members of various industries to keep them alert to the provisions of their industry rules and to offer them opportunity for review of the practices in their
industries.
. . . [T]hese . . . procedures have enabled the Commission during the

year to dispose of some 4,900 alleged rule violations in their early stages.
Without such means for prompt and satisfactory handling of these violations,
protection of the public interest might have required more lengthy and more
expensive formal proceedings ....
[A] number of industries received special
attention.
1950 FTC ANN. REP. 67.

A novel approach to industrywide enforcement of TPC rules was used in 1955
when a panel discussion was held for the wholesale plumbing and heating industry. The
questions and answers from the meeting were distributed to all members of the industry. 1955 FTC ANN. REP. 66. Both the FTC and industry have disclosed satisfaction
with this procedure through its continued use. For instance, in 1960 a conference was
held in New York City with representation of large department stores, chain drug
stores, and chain variety stores, at which time TPC rules on advertising, sale of jewelry,
and watches, and pertinent sets of guides were discussed. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 84.
Meetings of a similar nature were held elsewhere. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 64.
67. Ibid.
68. It has been indicated that the incidence of violation is significant. Preliminary
Rep. 32.
69. The adantages to be gained from the trade practice conference procedure have
been stated to be many: It permits simultaneous industrywide compliance; solves problems through a cooperative process which develops the best thoughts of all participants;
permits voluntary compliance by the great majority of businessmen; provides a rallying
point for the constructive forces of industry; assures businessmen that observance of
the practices outlined in the rules is proper, thereby providing more certainty as a basis
for industry investment; permits flexibility to meet fluctuating conditions; protects consumers' as well as competitors' rights, and results in economy of operation. CONTROL OF
UNFAIR COMiPETITIVE PRAcTIcEs THROUGH TRADE PRACTICE CONFERENCE PROCEDURE OF

THE FTC 14-18 (TNEC Monograph No. 34, 1941).
70. Id. at 19-25.
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home to the average businessman."'
However, the FTC's utilization of the standard provision"' and the publication of most Group IIrules"3 have provided extremely limited guidance for businessmen.
There appears to be little value in many of the Group II rules as
they are merely expressive of general requirements of "fair" play and
"good" business. Rules concerning obligations to perform contracts in
letter and spirit, maintenance of cost records, avoidance of fake or fictitious bids, and the misuse of buying and selling power 4 contribute only
slightly, if at all, to the education of the members of the industry and to
the uplifting of standards of competitive conduct. However, the utility
of Group II rules is a matter disputed by critics, and those favoring
these rules point to the value of establishing voluntary standards of
fair practice.'
The Group I rules in force run the gamut from the very general to
the very specific, and consist largely of the restatement or amplification
of unfair methods and practices or unlawful restraints of trade, including
deceptive acts and practices, which have been proscribed under the applicable statutes." The practices covered by the Group I rules include
misbranding, misrepresentation of various types, deceptive pricing, and
misuse of terms.77 To the extent that the rules do little more than restate
the statutory and decisional law they are of questionable assistance to
anyone and have been considered to discredit the whole conference pro71. See Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 51, at 450.
72. The standard provision is a TPC rule which is worded the same or substantially the same each time it is used in a set of TPC rules for an industry.
73. See note 58 supra.
74. See, e.g., the trade practice conference rules for the Public Seating Industry,
3 TRADE REG. REP. ff 41020 (1939). The questionable worth of Group II rules is illustrated by the following:
"It is the judgment of the industry that each member should independently keep
proper and accurate records for determining costs." Id. § 20.101.
"The industry approves the practice of each individual member of the industry
independently publishing and circulating to the purchasing trade its own price lists. Id.
§ 45.101.
"The unwarranted return of merchandise, not due to error on the part of the
shipper, creates waste and loss and increases the cost of doing business, and such practice is condemned by the industry." Id. § 87.106.
"Lawful contracts are business obligations which should be performed in letter and
in spirit. The repudiation of contracts by sellers on a rising market or by buyers on a
declining market is condemned by the industry." Id. § 181.103.
75. See Kittelle & Mostow, supra note 51, at 450. But see ATr'Y GEx. NAT'L
Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 370 (1955), which states the position that "Similarly tending to
discredit the program [enforcement] are vaguely phrased Group II rules ..
76. See Note, supra note 57, at 926.
77. For a more exhaustive listing see 1945 FTC ANm. REP. 66, 67.
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gram."' This criticism is particularly applicable to the rules relating
to antitrust statute violations.
For example, during fiscal years 1959-1961 the Commission issued
six new sets of rules."9 These sets of rules pertained to such diverse industries as wire and cable, business forms, tire and tube, and fluorocarbons. Yet the FTC issued standard rules worded substantially the
same for each of the six industries. In all sets of industry rules,
provisions pertaining to misrepresentation (general), substitution of
products, misleading price lists, prohibited discrimination, prohibited
forms of trade restraints, prohibited sales below cost, defamation of
competitors or false disparagement of their products, and aiding or abetting use of unfair trade practices 0 are to be found. Numerous other
rules for these industries are actually standard provisions but were not
repeated in each of the six sets under examination.8 1
Many of these standard provisions are certainly of minimal assis78.

ATT'y GEN. NAT'L Comm. ANTITRUST REP. 370 (1955).
79. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 64; 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 85; 1959 FTC ANN. REP. 72.
For a complete statement of these rules see Building Wire and Cable Mfg. Industry, 4
TRADE REG. REP. I 41042 (1958); Outlet and Switch Box Mfg. Industry, id. ff 41043
(1958) ; Work Glove Industry, id. ff 41046 (1959) ; Manifold Business Forms Industry,
id. f141047 (1959) ; Tire and Tube Repair Material Industry, id. ff 41048 (1960) ; Fluorocarbons Industry, id. f141051 (1961).
80. See 4 TRADE REa. REP. ff 41042 (1958), for specific wording of these rules.
For example, some of these standard provisions are worded as follows:
It is an unfair trade practice for any member of the industry, in connection
with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of industry products, to make or
publish by way of advertising . . . or otherwise, any statement or representation which . . . has the capacity and tendency or effect of deceiving pur-

chasers or prospective purchasers in any other material respect.
Id. § 42.1.
It is an unfair trade practice for a member of the industry to make an unauthorized substitution of products, where such substitution has the capacity and
tendency or effect of misleading or deceiving purchasers, by:
(a) Shipping or delivering industry products which do not conform to
samples submitted, to specifications . . . upon which the sale is consummated,
or to representations made prior to securing the order, without advising the
purchaser of the substitution and obtaining his consent thereto prior to making
shipment or delivery; or
(b) Falsely representing the reason for making a substitution.

Id. § 42.2.

The defamation of competitors by falsely imputing to them dishonorable conduct, inability to perform contracts, questionable credit standing, or by other
false representations, or the false disparagement of the quality, grade, origin,
use, construction, design . . . or distribution of the products of competitors or
their business methods, selling prices, values . . . policies or services, is an
unfair trade practice.

Id. § 42.11.
81. See, e.g., standard provisions pertaining to enticing away employees of competitors, commercial bribery, and misrepresentation as to character of business, which provisions appear in numerous sets of industry rules. Id. ff 41051, §§ 51.2, 51.17, 51.19

(1961).
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tance to the members of the industries, for they are not expressed in
specific terms which could be readily applied to industry problems. In
fact it is surprising to note that not one rule in any of the sets was
couched in terms of the particular industry. 2 Consequently, the real
value of the trade practice conference procedure, as regards these industries, stems from the discussions at conferences and hearings held at
the time of the formulation of the rules and from the limited advantages
which flow from a partial codification of statutory and decisional law.
While industry conference rules which are mere statements of existing law do not appear to substantially serve the public interest, those
rules fashioned in specific language capable of practical application to
every day business problems serve a vital and useful guidance purpose.8 3
The rules for the pleasure boat industry, 4 for instance, include provisions
for description as to length,85 deceptive speed claims,8" deception as to
maintenance,8 7 and deceptive use of wood names. 8 Rules of this kind"9
are unusually valuable in the case of a newly emerging or rapidly expanding industry and are helpful in averting an unlawful practice or
act which is in its incipiency.9" The rules issued for the optical products
industry are a good example of rules which have served as a valuable
guide for a rapidly growing industry."'
82. See note 79 supra.
83. See generally rules which were carefully and specifically worded that have
become the basis of legislative enactment, address by Commissioner MacIntyre, before
the Winter Conference of the American Marketing Association, in New York, N. Y.,
Dec. 27, 1961, p. 15.
84. 4 TRADE REG. REP. 1 41056 (1961).
85. "Any representation as to the length of a boat . . . must state the exact distance measured end to end over the deck of such boat, excluding sheer." Id. § 56.2.
86. "Claims that a boat is capable of a specified speed by the use of such terms as
'up to x miles per hour' or by similar representation, shall not be used unless the boat
will attain the specified speed under usual conditions or as represented." Id. § 56.3.
87. No representation to the effect that a boat is "maintenance free" shall be
used unless the boat so described, including installed components such as its
propulsion machinery, sails, etc., will not rot, rust or otherwise deteriorate during the expected life of such boat, and will require no sanding, scraping, painting, patching, or other repair, except for accidental damage sustained, and will
require no replacement of a part or parts as a result of wear during the life
expectancy of such boat.
Id. § 56.4.
88. No representation to the effect that a boat is "(name of wood)" shall be
used unless the boat so described is throughout, except for minor braces, etc.,
solidly of the named wood. When a representation regarding the wood composition of a -boat is properly applicable to only certain portions of the boat,
such fact shall be clearly stated, e.g., "solid cypress planking," "teak decks."
Id. § 56.5.
89. See, e.g., rules for the following industries: Jewelry Industry, id. U 41023
(1959) ; Metallic Watch Band, id. 141060 (1962) ; Mirror Industry, id. 1 41118 (1962).
90. See address by Commissioner Mac Intyre, op. cit. supra note 83, p. 16.
91. 4 TRADE REG. RF,. 1 41192 (1962). Although these industry rules contain several of the standard provisions previously discussed, there are provisions which interpret
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The value of the rules for the pleasure boat and optical industries
certainly exceeds that of the sLx new sets of rules issued between 19591961. But regardless of the educational value of these rules, their usefulness will primarily be measured by the caliber of the enforcement program conducted by the FTC.
Only a small group of men is charged with administering the rules.92
Their task is to observe and assist tens of thousands of businesses in
complying not only with thousands of trade practice conference rules,
but also with the statutes administered by the FTC.93 The result of their
efforts has been the voluntary correction of hundreds of violations annually."' Nevertheless it must be recognized that the TPC program has
the laws in terms of the industry such as the rules for false advertising of nonprescription magnifying spectacles, false advertising of contact lenses, prohibited payments by dispensers to doctors, and prohibited tying of refractions with dispensing.
Portions of these provisions follow:
It is an unfair trade practice for any industry member to publish . . . any advertisement or sales presentation relating to non-prescription magnifying spectacles . . . which represents . . . that the spectacles so offered will correct

* * * defects in vision of persons, unless it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed in the advertisement . . . that the correction of defects in vision by
such products is limited to persons approximately 40 years of age and older who
do not have astigmatism or diseases of the eye and who require only simple
magnifying or reducing lenses.
Id. § 192.2.
It is an unfair trade practice, in the offering for sale, sale, or distribution of
contact lenses, for an industry member to publish or cause to be published any
advertisement which represents directly or by implication that contact lenses:
(a) Are suitable and safe for all persons, regardless of their age, health,
or eye condition;
(b) Can be worn satisfactorily and without discomfort by all, or nearly
all, persons; . . .
(j) Are unbreakable in all circumstances; or are unbreakable in any indicated circumstances when such is not the fact.
Id. § 192.3.
It is unfair trade practice for any dispenser to make or give . . . to any doctor
* * : any payment arising out of or connected with his (the dispenser's) sale
or dispensing of eyeglasses or contact lenses to a patient of such doctor, whether
such payment be in the form of

.

.

.

a rebate, credit . . . or otherwise.

Id. § 192.7(b).

92. Interviews; see Note, supra note 57, at 943, which indicates that in 1953 the
Rules Administration Unit was eleven men.
93. See, e.g., note 1 .rpra.
94. Certain aspects of the administrative activities of the Division of Trade Practice Conferences are compared below for the fiscal years indicated.*

Conifereniccs**
Pending at beginning
Applications received
Pending at end
Rules**
In force beginning
New and revised rules
Rescinded rules

In force end

'955
38
14
37

z958
25
11
29

1959
29
23
20

196o

20
11
28

1961
28
12
30

163
6

161
5

159
14

163
3

161
1

16

2

153

159

-

-

-

163

161

162

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
not achieved the high goals of industrywide compliance which were set
for it over forty years ago. The fact that fewer sets of TPC rules are
in force today than ten years ago attests to the FTC's dissatisfaction
with the program.9 5
Solution of the compliance problems under the TPC procedure,
however, does not seem to be wholly in an increase in the staff administering the rules, though unquestionably this step would be somewhat
beneficial by permitting the FTC to promulgate more rules shaped to
meet the needs of industry and to police compliance with the rules more
thoroughly. On the other hand, suggested revisions of the TPC program are difficult to formulate. In an attempt, however, to operate a
TPC program more geared to its capacities, the FTC might well consider emphasizing other voluntary procedures, especially with regard to
unlawful practices or acts covered by the standard provisions. Not only
would more thorough and widespread education of industry result from
using the guides or trade regulation rules in such instances, but also
those administering the TPC program would be freer to concentrate on
those problems which are peculiar to a particular industry.
B. Guides. In 1955 an alternate, industrywide voluntary compliance procedure was instituted-the guides program.9" The guides, as
well as the trade practice conference rules, are interpretive statements of
decisional and statutory law which do not have the force and effect of
substantive law," yet the two procedures are separate and distinct. Since
the inception of the guides program, nine sets of guides have been released by the Commission, covering in the main deceptive and misleading
Compliance with rules
Matters pending beginning
Initiated matters
Matters disposed
Matters pending
Rule Interpretation
Matters pending
Requests
Matters disposed
Matters pending

of
end

178

290

395

551

361

553
519
212

539
434
395

727
571
551

584
774
361

570
513
418

-

36
221
216
41

41
241
246
36

36
246
242
40

40
263
286
17

beginning
of
end

* All figures are compiled from the FTC Annual Reports. A dash indicates none
or information not available.
** Not all actions as regards rules and conferences were available; therefore, the
figures will not total in all cases.
95. In 1961 rules were in force for 162 industries, while in 1952, 179 sets of rules
were under administration. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 64; 1952 FTC ANN. REP. 64.
96. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 1 7894 (1961). The program was begun absent any fanfare; in fact only passing reference was made by the FTC to the issuance of the first
set of guides. 1956 FTC ANN. REP. 61.

97.

57 BNA

ANTITRUST

& TRADE

REG.

REP. A-16 (Aug. 14, 1962).
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advertising practices."8
1. Procedure. Guides are administrative interpretations pertaining
to a particular unlawful practice which are prepared by the Division of
Trade Practice Conferences and Guides and issued by the Commission
to its staff.9" Promulgation of a set of guides may result from action
by the Commission on its own motion or upon application by any interested person, but to date all guides appear to have been initiated by
the Commission. Although a comprehensive policy statement concerning the guides has not been made by the Commission, apparently they
will be issued "when it appears to the Commission that guidance as to the
legal requirements applicable to particular practices would serve to bring
about more widespread and equitable observance of laws administered
by it."' 00
The Division of Trade Practice Conferences and Guides utilizes applicable law and the administrative assistance of other offices or agencies
in preparing a set of guides.' 0 ' Prior to approval, a proposed set of
guides may be distributed by mail to interested and concerned parties,
who in turn are invited to comment upon and criticize the proposals. Any
comments by interested parties are considered in the final drafting of
the guides."0 2
Basically, the sets of guides can be grouped into two categories:
(1) those designed to cure ills in a particular industry, and (2) those
applicable to particular practices which cut across industry lines. IllusThese sets of guides are listed below in the order of issuance: Cigarette AdTRADE REG. RE'. ff 7894 (1955) ; Tire Advertising Guides, id. 1 7899
(1958) ; Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, id. f1 7897 (1958) ; Guides Against Bait Advertising, id. ff 7893 (1959); Guides Against Deceptive Advertising of Guarantees, id.
ff 7895 (1960) ; Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments
and Services, on file in the FTC Library; Guides Against Advertising for Fallout
Shelters, id. ff 7900 (1962); Guides for Advertising Shell Homes, id. ff 7901 (1962);
7902 (1962).
Guides for Shoe Content Labeling and Advertising, id.
99. BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-11 (Dec. 4, 1962). Originally, however, the guides program was operated directly under the supervision of the Director of
the Bureau of Consultation (now the Bureau of Industry Guidance). Later it operated
under a separate division which recently was called the Advisory Opinions and Guides
Division. On November 1, 1962, the guides program was shifted to the Division of
Trade Practice Conferences. Ibid.
100. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.82, 27 Fed. Reg. 4612 (1962). Chairman Dixon
has stated that guides may be formulated not only when the majority of the public is
being deceived, but even "if it finds that substantial numbers or a substantial proportion
of purchasers or prospective purchasers . . . are likely to be deceived." Address by
Chairman Dixon, before the National Shoe Fair of America, in Chicago, Ill., Oct. 15,
1962, p. 11.
101. E.g., in drafting the Guides for Advertising Fallout Shelters, the technical
assistance of the Office of Civil Defense of the Department of Defense and the
Federal Housing Administration of the Housing and Home Finance Agency was tapped.
7900 (1962).
2 TRADE Rmc. REP.
102. 23 Fed. Reg. 3713 (1958).
98.

vertising Guides, 2
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trative of the first type are the Cigarette Advertising Guides." 3 Prohibitions set out in these guides are of two types-qualified and unqualified. Representations that cigarette smoking will not have a physical effect, or that refer to the effect of smoking on certain organs or
segments of the body, or that report medical approval are unequivocally
proscribed."' Other guides in this set are of a qualified nature-that
is, representations are permissible provided certain specified conditions
are met. For instance, claims as to tars and nicotine content of one
brand in comparison with other brands of cigarettes must be supported
by "competent scientific proof" and must be significant.'
The second category of guides, those custom-made to meet a practice pervasive of many industries, can best be demonstrated by the Guides
The FTC issued these guides to help
Against Deceptive Pricing.'
eliminate direct or implied representations of any fictitious price claims
of manufacturers, wholesalers, sellers, or others. Throughout this set
of guides the keystone to proper pricing practice is primarily centered on
the savings from the "usual and customary retail price of the article in
the trade area, or areas, where the statement is made," or on the savings
"from the advertiser's usual and customary retail price of the article in
the recent, regular course of business," placing emphasis, therefore, on
pricing requirements which would least subject the general public to
deception or misunderstanding. 7
As finally phrased, a set of guides is not intended to cover every
question which conceivably may arise in a particular industry. Rather,
7900-02
103. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7f 7894 (1955). See id. ff 7899 (1958); id. 1111
(1962) for other sets of guides in this category.
104. Id. Guides 1, 3, 4.
105. Id. Guide 2. Comparisons of volume of sales with competitive brands or
qualities of tobacco are forbidden, unless based on reliable information available at time
of dissemination. Id. Guide 5. Also, testimonials are disallowed unless genuine and the
advertiser has a reasonable belief that it represents the author's opinion. Id. Guide 6.
106. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 7 7897 (1958). See id. ff 7897 (1958), 7 7893 (1959), and
the Guides for Advertising Allowances and Other Merchandising Payments and Services, on file in the FTC Library, for other sets of guides in this category. The latter
set of guides marks the first application of the guides procedure to the more complex
areas of trade regulation, the Robinson-Patman Act. The FTC did not conduct a voluntary enforcement program in connection with the administration of these guides; rather
what was done consisted of explaining, educating and interpreting, thereby enabling the
businessman to find answers to difficult specific problems. Interviews.
However, these guides "have begun to awaken the hoped-for response in important
segments of the business community. . .

."

Address by Kintner, before the 57th An-

nual Convention of the National Food Brokers Association, in Chicago, Ill., Dec. 10,
1960, p. 13. Hopefully the FTC envisions using the guides to thwart unlawful practices in the rapidly expanding supermarket chains. Address by Chairman Dixon, before
the National Wholesale Grocers, in Bal Harbor, Fla., April 16, 1962, p. 2. Thus, the
value of the guides procedure, even for some of the more intricate legal problems facing
the FTC, is evident.
107. 2 TRADE REG. REP. 117897 (1958).
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the guides are aimed at elimination of major abuses." 8 When the cir-cumstances dictate, changes or modifications of the guides are made."'
2. Program of Observance. The primary compliance tool in connection with the guides program has been education."' This is premised
upon the belief that businessmen will regulate their conduct when informed of what the law demands. Mandatory enforcement measures
are utilized only where voluntary measures have failed or where, for
reasons of policy, voluntary methods are considered inadequate."' The
guides in no way amount to a finding by the Commission and do not
necessarily affect any formal or informal matter before it."2 Nor does
the issuance of a set of guides alter any cease and desist order or stipulation in effect prior or subsequent to issuance of the guides." 8
As a check on compliance with the guides, the FTC has a program
of review of all advertising media." 4 Additionally, numerous applications
for complaints are received from consumers, and these are likewise
screened for violations. It has been indicated that the FTC will first
seek voluntary discontinuance of a purportedly unlawful practice prior
to invoking any mandatory sanctions." 5
Another phase of the observance program concerns the advice and
guidance given businessmen on proposed advertising themes. These informal views of the staff aid the advertiser in avoiding the dissemination of deceptive or misleading claims."' Similarly, upon request the
staff provides other informal interpretations of the guides or any pertinent law administered by the FTC."7 Indeed, the somewhat general
language of the guides acquires specific meaning as they are individually
applied.
Under the guides program the FTC recently developed a conference
technique for educating businessmen and the public on the guides, TPC
rules, and statutes under the FTC's jurisdiction. This enforcement
108. Ibid.
109. Id. ff 7894 (1955).
110. Address by Brain, before a City-Wide Business Meeting, in Cincinnati, Ohio,
Sept. 28, 1960, p. 1.
111. 2 TwADE REG. REI. 17894 (1955). Seventy-eight compliance matters arising
under the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing were referred to the Bureau of Investigation in 1960 for further disposition. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 83. Of course, referrals
occur under other sets of guides also.
112. 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 7894 (1955).
113. Ibid.
114. 1957 FTC ANN. REP. 57; see note 66 supra.
115. 2 TRADE REG. REP. ff 7894 (1955).
116. In 1960 such advice was given to 68 tire and related firms for the Tire Advertising Guides in response to 138 requests pertaining to the Guides Against Deceptive
Pricing. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 71.
117. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 68.
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technique has taken the form of industry, city, or area-wide meetings.
The conference technique was initiated with a city-wide meeting in
Cincinnati in 1960. Representatives of over 2,000 business concerns
were invited to attend and discuss four sets of guides with the FTC's
staff.'1 8 The conference was conducted by the FTC in conjunction with
the Better Business Bureau, which was to be instrumental in maintaining
community wide compliance with the guides following the meeting. An
intensive informal compliance drive followed the conference. Realizing
the success of this technique, the FTC scheduled frequent meetings during the six months after the Cincinnati conference." 9
Another series of conferences was aimed at particular products,
types of stores, or industries. In several cities, conferences were held to
familiarize representatives of drug, variety, and department stores with
guides and trade practice conference rules for advertising and selling of
jewelry and watches. 2 ' Pertinent rules and guides were mailed in advance to prospective conferees, and subsequent to a presentation by the
Generally,
FTC's staff, a question and answer period was conducted.'
the result of these conferences and the voluntary compliance efforts
which followed, has been a substantial reduction of violations in the vicinity of the conference.' 22
A third series of conferences was called to discuss public deception.
Representatives of consumer and public service organizations were invited for the purpose of acquainting them with the operations of the
FTC and with the more prevalent unfair and misleading business practices. In this way the consumer was better protected from the "use of
chicanery in the marketplace,"' 28 and, incidentally, better able to act as a
118. FTC News Summary No. 61, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 2, col. 1.
119. Further, the FTC received many invitations from communities desiring to
raise the local standards of truth in advertising. FTC News Summary No. 5, Jan. 25,
1961, p. 1, col. 2; 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 67.

120. See, e.g., note 66 supra and accompanying text; FTC News Summary No. 58,
Sept. 1, 1960, p. 1, col. 2. Then-Chairman Kintner stated that
These conferences support the Commission's policy to gain voluntary compliance with the laws it administers on an industry-wide basis. Due to the
variety of merchandise handled, department stores may not be familiar with
the rules for advertising and selling jewelry and watches resulting in frequent unintentional violations on their part.
FTC News Summary No. 61, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 2, col. 2.

121. Ibid.
122. Ibid. Similar conferences were held in Washington, D. C., for the appliance
dealers. Simultaneous improvement was noted, and formal complaints were issued
against three recalicitrant sellers on charges of fictitiously representing reductions in
prices. FTC News Summary No. 78, Nov. 28, 1960, p. 1, col. 2; FTC News Summary

No. 69, Oct. 17, 1960, p. 4, col. 1.
123. Address by Kintner, before the Annual Convention of the National Association
and Council of Business Schools, in Miami Beach, Fla., Oct. 28, 1960, p. 13.
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source of information for the FTC.
One other voluntary enforcement technique of consequence has been
used by the FTC to secure widespread observance of the guides. In
connection with the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing the FTC sent letters to manufacturers, importers, or retailers of camera and photo equipment and enclosed a set of the guides. Recipients were asked to give
assurances that any misuse of list or other suggested prices would be
halted and to submit samples of current advertising to evidence compliance. The technique proved effective.' 4
Thus, diverse means of encouraging compliance with the guides are
available to the FTC, enabling it to act flexibly in selecting an enforcement technique based on the nature and extent of the challenged practice.'2 Proper employment of the presently available enforcement techniques could produce a sound and fruitful program of enforcement of
the guides.
3. Effectiveness of the Guides Program. Generally, the guides
seem to be a more feasible approach to widespread enforcement problems than the TPC rules which only pertain to one industry. Frequently
a practice touches all types of industry, and more thorough education of
both business and the public will result from issuance of guides. 6 Further, formulation of guides-unlike TPC rules-requires no public
hearings or conferences and, consequently, guides can be issued more
quickly. Moreover, since issuance of guides is not dependent upon assurance of industry cooperation, guides can be formulated to cover industries which are not initially inclined to engage in a program of voluntary compliance. In particular, the guides program is a means for securing an equitable and industrywide solution to antitrust and trade regulation infractions. 2 ' Of course, the issuance of guides alone will not
suffice; it is only through concentrated guidance and enforcement efforts
124. Over forty million persons buy cameras and regulated products annually.

Therefore, the attack was centered on fictitious list retail prices in newspapers and

magazines with national circulation. FTC News Release, July 1, 1960.
125. See Kintner, The FTC in 196o-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, CCH ANTITRUST
LAW Sx'mip. 21 (1961).
126. Typical examples where the guides approach would be better are some of the
standard provisions reprinted in nearly every set of trade practice conference rules.
See note 80 supra, and accompanying text. Yet in instances where TPC rules are writ-

ten in the specific terms of an industry or in rare cases where an unlawful act or prac-

tice is prevalent in one or a few firms of an industry, the usefulness of the TPC rule

is not to be disregarded.

127. Guides tend to eliminate competitive disadvantages resulting at times from
the case-by-case method of enforcement of the law. "[T]he guides therefore are another of the first lines of approach to the problem of equal impact of law enforcement
upon competing members of an industry." Tait, Equitable Treatment of Competitors,
CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYuM. 75, 81 (1960).
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that solution to industrywide problems is achieved. Therefore, while at
first glance the TPC and guides programs seem to overlap noticeably,
there are important characteristics of each which make continuance of
both programs desirable.
Recently the guides program was transferred from the Advisory
Opinions and Guides Division to the Division of Trade Practice Conferences and Guides.12 No announcement was made by the FTC of the
significance of this transfer, but it has been indicated that the chief
reason for the transfer may mean an eventual abandonment of the guides
program."
As will be illustrated by an analysis of the significance of
two of the sets of guides, any reduction at this time in the emphasis
placed on the guides program may seriously reduce the potential effectiveness of the overall program of voluntary compliance.
The impact on compliance of the two categories of sets of guides
can best be measured by a closer review of the Cigarette Advertising
Guides and the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.'
Accurate appraisal
of the importance of the former set of guides is necessarily limited, as in
the case of all voluntary procedures, but the FTC has indicated that from
the first these guides have had a healthy impact on the elimination of
objectionable advertising.'
It has been reported that in fiscal years
1958-1960, 148 questionable cigarette claims were voluntarily discontinued or revised, and that, in 1960, the eliminated claims pertained to
thirty different brands of cigarettes.2 2
The most notable achievement, however, has been the voluntary and
simultaneous abandonment of tar and nicotine claims by the seven major
manufacturers. This occurred as a direct result of serious and purposeful negotiations between the industry and the FTC.'
As must be obvious, this revision of advertising policy by the tobacco industry was no
128. See note 99 supra.
129. Interviews.
130. See nn. 103-07 szpra, and accompanying text.
131.

1956 FTC ANN. REP. 60.

132. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 82; 1959 FTC

ANN. REP. 70; 1958 FTC ANN. REP. 66.
133. Because the Tobacco Industry had no generally accepted standard method of
testing to determine the tar and nicotine content of cigarette smoke, a public conference
was held in 1958 to give the FTC facts necessary to permit it to develop testing specifications for appraisal of data upon which the claims were based. Representatives of
manufacturers, testing laboratories, government agencies, magazine publishers and medi-

cal groups attended the conference.

Subsequent to the conference the FTC continued

working with those connected with preparation of the industry test date in standardizing a method to examine the validity of the claims. Finally in 1960 the unsubstantiated
representations of the cigarette manufacturing industry were eliminated. 1960 FTC
ANN. REP. 82; 1958 FTC ANN. REP. 66.
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Yet it
minor undertaking from the standpoint of time or investment.'
is unquestionable and equally obvious that these claims deceived the public and were unsupportable by the industry.
Therefore, it may be concluded that the Cigarette Advertising Guides
have been a successful deterrent to unlawful advertising practices in one
industry. In light of current decisions, expansion of this set of guides
into other areas is a strong possibility, but a thorough discussion of this
question is beyond the scope of this note."'
The Guides Against Deceptive Pricing are phrased to take cognizance of the injury which can result from false savings claims. Yet the
guides recognize representations used in the trade that may well result
in savings to the consumer. It is only the claim which is void of marketplace reality that is challenged."' Of all the guides issued, those directed
agrainst deceptive pricing have been most effective; their benefits have
accrued immeasurably to the consumer, industry, and the competitive system.137 Indeed, general acceptance of the guides has been remarkable,
and has been expressed in letters initiated by businessmen declaring an
intent to voluntarily comply, in the wide coverage granted by news media,
and in the city and trade association programs aimed at integrity in advertising. These guides have served as a rallying point for those concerned with truth in advertising of savings claims."'
Widespread distribution of this set of guides-which has placed an
134. Cigarette advertisers are reported to spend in the neighborhood of
$190,000,000 per year for advertising. It is no small feat for them, therefore,
to change the major emphasis of a number of brands. . . . [T]his is a landmark example of industry-government cooperation in solving a pressing problem.
Address by Kintner, before the Second Annual Mid-Winter Conference of the Advertising Federation of America, in Washington, D. C., Feb. 5, 1960, p. 29.
135. See, e.g., Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir.
1961), where the court found that the evidence supporting the existence of a causal relationship between cigarette smoking and plaintiff's malignancy was sufficient to require
submission of the case to the jury.

136. For example, the comparison of advertiser's selling price to similar merchandise currently offered for sale is permissible if three requirements are met: (1) the
representation clearly discloses that the comparison is with comparable merchandise
and not with previous selling prices of the advertiser; (2) the merchandise compared
with is of like grade and quality in all respects; (3) the comparable merchandise is
generally offered for sale at the quoted price in the same trade area or the contrary
fact is adequately disclosed. Among other devices which are permitted under the guides
are pre-ticketing, two for one sales, and the " /2 Price"-"lc sale" conditioned on purchase of additional merchandise. Id. Guides 1, 3, 5-6, 8.
137. The drive against fictitious pricing held immediate interest for many a
citizen who never before had been aware of the Federal Trade Commission or
its purposes. Indeed, this fact undoubtedly contributed to the sharp rise in the
request for Commission action against other deception of consumers.
Address by Kintner, before the Washington Chapter, American Marketing Association,

Washington, D. C., March 24, 1960, p. 9.
138.

1959 FTC ANN. REP. 70.
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estimated three quarters of a million copies in the hands of businessmen
and consumers in a year and a half 8 9-- and programs of education 40 have brought about an extensive reduction in comparative price
abuses. According to reports, over four hundred unlawful claims were
abandoned or corrected voluntarily upon request of the FTC. 4 ' Also, a
1959 Better Business Bureau survey revealed that over ninety per cent
of the Bureaus reporting deemed the guides effective. 42 Success in securing compliance with these guides can be largely attributed to the
imaginative compliance techniques of the FTC and the resultant enthusiastic support of businessmen, the public, and various associations.
Though many of the individual guides just discussed seem to reflect settled law, they are written in laymen's language and, in effect,
adapt present problems to the law. To the extent that some guides
merely restate existing law,' 4 8 it is true that they are of minimal educational value.'44 Yet, to the extent that they are applied to the specific
situations they take on a different value.
The conference technique has been successfully utilized with regard
to the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing and other guides. If the apparent decline in utilization of this technique indicates a policy decision
to minimize its use, the FTC should be urged to reconsider its action.""
The conference method seemed to provide the consumer and the businessman with the rallying point essential to extensive efforts in selfregulation.'4 6 Admittedly, the FTC would be wholly incapable of ful139. See address by Kintner, op. cit. supra note 134, p. 35. The FTC alone distributed over 110,000 copies in the first two and one-half years. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 67;
1960 FTC ANN. REt. 83; 1959 FTC ANN. REP. 70 (1959).

140. See address by Kintner, op. cit. supra note 134, pp. 32-36. An example of the
cooperation and steps towards self-regulation which resulted is the Louisville, Kentucky,
plan. The "Louisville Courier-Journal" published a twelve page spread of the program
in conjunction with the Better Business Bureau's enforcement effort. At least 800 local
business firms joined in the program. Id. p. 34.
141. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 67; 1960 FTC ANN. R P. 83; 1959 FTC ANN. REP. 71.
142. See Address by Kintner, op. cit. supra note 134, p. 35; Interviews.
143. See, e.g., 2 TRADE REa. RE'. ff 7894, Guide 7 (1955).
144. It has been maintained that even to the extent that guides reflect detailed interpretations of law they may be unsatisfactory. The criticism is that a businessman
should not be subjected to the threat of publicity and other pressures in order to coerce
compliance with the guides. Address by Austern, before the New York University
School of Law, New York, N.Y., April 1, 1960, p. 17, on file in the New York University School of Law Library. But it is certainly doubtful that the FTC's enforcement measures could in reality be deemed coercive. Any reasonable pressure which
may be applied against an actor engaged in an unlawful act or practice as a result of an
informed public and an enlightened group of competitors is wholly desirable.
145. Since April, 1961 there is no official report of conferences being held.
146. Because of the overall guides program of enforcement, all segments of "the
advertising industry have developed self-regulatory, self-policing programs such as business has never before known in terms of the scope and effectiveness." Address by
Kintner, before the Annual Meeting of the Advertising Federation of America, in Wash-

SYMPOSIUM

filling its statutory objectives without the cooperation of business. Therefore it is difficult to comprehend why the FTC would intentionally turn
from a practice conducive to unlimited assistance from industry. Without the personal contact derived from the community wide and industrywide conference, the FTC has no effective method for stimulating local
level voluntary enforcement programs and, in fact, may fail to discover
the problems which are disturbing the businessman.
In the last analysis any successful program of voluntary compliance
must be backed by vigorous application of mandatory measures where
applicable. Two changes in procedure should be considered. First, insofar as possible, the individual charged with administering the guides
should have the authority to investigate and recommend issuance of a
complaint, since he is the one best positioned to make such decisions.
Secondly, at present the FTC is only attacking manufacturers who violate the guides, while all sets of guides pertain to the retailer as well.147
In order to make compliance with the guides meaningful, violators at all
levels must be compelled to comply to the extent that the FTC's manpower and funds will permit.
Certain complex areas of antitrust law do not lend themselves to
treatment under the guides, but there are countless areas still untapped
which should be considered. 4 ' It is believed by some that the guides
program can fulfill the high expectations of the founders of the FTC,149
and even the FTC has in the past optimistically regarded the guides as an
exceptional tool for "compelling" compliance."'
C. Advisory Opinions. For the first time in its history the FTC
ington, D. C., May 30, 1961, p. 10. The Advertising Federation of America and the
Association of National Advertisers, Inc. each published a book on truth in advertising.
Cleveland and other cities developed community wide programs for maintaining public
confidence in advertising. Television and radio stations adopted codes of good practice,
and the national and local chapters of the Better Business Bureaus increased their regulatory activity in areas covered by the guides. Id. pp. 11-39.

147. Interviews.
148. See, e.g., address by Kintner, op. cit. supra note 106, p. 14.
149. Address by Kintner, before the Advertising Club of Shreveport, in Shreveport, La., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 18.
150. [I]dentifying a particular area of false and misleading advertising and
then setting forth . . . exactly what the law's requirements are
was considered a prime function of the FTC.
Such clarification issued either as industry guides or as guides to the Commission's staff, has the effect of warning sellers against the use of deception and
of alerting buyers to what the deception is.
The decision to issue these guides . . . was based . . . on the belief that
a clear, emphatic and specific warning in the law's requirements could not be
lightly ignored by those reluctant to comply. Defiance would show up under
the spotlight of industry and public awareness of the problem, the better to
be attacked by the Commission's mandatory processes.
1958 FTC ANN. REP. 1.
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has undertaken to issue advisory opinions, where practicable, to enable
businessmen to determine "whether a proposed course of action, if pursued, may violate any of the laws administered by the Commission."''
Previously the staff had furnished informal advice to businessmen upon
request, but the FTC did not make specific provision for rendering such
views in specific factual situations.'52
1. Procedure. Any individual or business has the opportunity to
take advantage of the advisory opinion procedure."' Conferences with
the FTC's staff may be held in connection with the request, and, upon the
basis of information required to be submitted by the Commission, the
requesting party is advised whether his proposed course of action is likely
to conflict with the laws under the FTC's jurisdiction."' The advice is
not binding upon agencies which exercise concurrent jurisdiction,' nor
is the opinion binding upon the FTC. However, if the FTC later adopts
a different viewpoint in consonance with the public interest, the inquirer
will not be proceeded against on the basis of the information submitted
without first having had an opportunity to discontinue the practice which
was followed in good faith reliance on the advice of the FTC."'6
2. Effectiveness of the Advisory Opinion Procedure. The effectiveness of the advisory opinion in an individual case is not doubted, but
the practical limitations upon such a procedure raise serious questions
concerning its extensive use. The procedure only aids the inquirer-not
an industry nor an area. The problems which are attacked are individual ones, and, in a sense, many of the shortcomings of the case-by-case
approach apply. Because the procedure is time consuming and the approach tends to be narrow-so narrow that some have felt it may result
in "tough" opinions at the outer edges of the existing law' 5 --it is questionable whether this approach to voluntary compliance, unless used sparingly, will maximize the benefits which the FTC can derive from its
critically limited resources.
151. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.91, 27 Fed. Reg. 4612 (1962).
152. Informal guidance was likewise given after review of compliance with cease
and desist orders, where warranted. Also, prior to the demise of the Small Business
Division in July, 1961, advice and guidance were given to small businesses. 1955 FTC
ANN. REP. 1; 48 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. B-1 (June 12, 1962).
153. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.92, 27 Fed. Reg. 4612 (1962).
154. Id. § 1.93. Possibly the FTC will go a step further and suggest a course of
action which would satisfy the requirements of the law.
155. Address by Chairman Dixon, before American Association of Advertising
Agencies, in White Sulphur Springs, W. Va., April 28, 1962, p. 11.
156. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.93, 27 Fed. Reg. 4612 (1962).
157. The much feared consequence of such a situation is that the "far out opinions
may then become hardened in bureaucratic concrete." 48 BNA ANTITRUST & TaDE
REG. RE'. B-3 (June 2, 1962).
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Only a few men are presently assigned to handle the requests for
advisory opinions,' and they have been directed to answer all inquiries
Although it is yet undetermined how extensively
where possible."'
businessmen will utilize this procedure, present indications are that it
has met with favor. 6 ' Therefore, since the response should be sizeable,
it is difficult to foresee how such a small staff can reply to the requests
in a timely and accurate manner. 6' Replies which are delayed for a
long period of time will often be of relatively little worth to the small
businessman and may cause the larger businessman to shun the pro102
cedure.
Two dangers in the use of advisory opinions are apparent: (1) the
FTC may fail to review the opinions periodically 3 and (2) the inquirer
may rely on the advice of the FTC and fail to consult counsel as the facts
change. Unless the opinion was suitably limited in the first instance, in
the final analysis both dangers may lead to the same result; that is, the
FTC, confronted by changed economic conditions for an industry, will
be required to revise or rescind its advice. This may cause, in some instances, substantial injury to the requester in his investments and con158. Interviews.
159. Ibid. Yet requests as to matters involving scientific or medical questions that
could not be answered without extensive testing have been denied. 71 BNA ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. A-18 (Nov. 20, 1962).
160. Chairman Dixon has referred to the volume of requests as an "avalanche."
z962 Hearings 956, 966. Commissioner Anderson is concerned that such a "flood of requests" could destroy the usefulness of the procedure. 71 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-18 (Nov. 20, 1962) ; 51 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (July 3,
1962). The recent transfer of the guides to the Division of TPC and Guides seems to
signify that the Division of Advisory Opinions is heavily overburdened. 73 BNA
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-I1 (Dec. 4, 1962).
161. In the first five months since the announcement of this procedure only 14
advisory opinions were issued, covering "tripartite advertising programs, country of
origin markings, mergers, pricing programs" and so forth. 71 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. A-18 (Nov. 20, 1962). At that rate of output it is clear that the staff will
fall far behind in answering requests.
Obviously, where the request is for advance approval on a new or untried plan, the
difficulties presented the FTC in rendering an opinion are even greater than where
only modifications of existing plans or plans of other industries are adopted. Yet from
the very nature of the advisory opinion it is not unlikely that many requests will concern advice on newly devised plans.
162. Commissioner Anderson has expressed the view that
[T]hese requests, which carry the Commissioner's approval rather than staff
approval, will have to be processed pretty rapidly because the advice that is
sought has to be pretty current, and if we wait too long in giving the advice, it
may be of little value to the inquirers.
51 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (July 3, 1962). Commissioner Elman has
been more sweeping in his criticism and has dismissed the whole advisory opinion procedure as being unrealistic and impracticable. FTC News Release, May 15, 1962.
163. Though provision for review of the advisory opinions has not been made in
the Rules of Practice, a procedure has no doubt been established for internal review.
This periodic review procedure could in time become a considerable burden for the FTC.
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tracts and, in every instance, costly revision of all plans based on the
advice.
The FTC as yet has not defined when a "course of action" is "proposed." Clearly, any new course of action would be included. But will
an inquiry about continuing a present course of action, which is considered illegal by the Commission, be given equal protection from immediate prosecution? Or, where the FTC requests submittal of additional information which indicates that the inquirer is currently following a practice deemed to be illegal, will such information subject the inquirer to an immediate proceeding?..4 These questions are unanswered
to date. In both instances, however, it would seem that sound enforcement policies would dictate protection of the inquirer in all cases where
he has expressed a willingness to comply with the laws, except in the
most unusual circumstances.
In the final analysis, the advisory opinion procedure will be an effective method of education only if the FTC responds promptly to selected requests.16 Action under this procedure should be limited mainly
to instances where the issues are fairly clear-cut, enabling the staff and
the FTC to act efficiently and unqualifiedly. In other instances the
advice and guidance function of the FTC could better be achieved through
greater emphasis on the other established methods of voluntary compliance, particularly the guides procedure.
D. Trade Regulation Rules. Under its revised Rules of Practice,
the Commission will now consider issuing trade regulation rules to resolve industrywide or area wide problems on an overall basis."' No
clear picture is presented as to the force of these rules in an adjudicatory
proceeding. The Rules of Practice merely state that "the Commission
may rely upon such rule, provided the respondent shall have been given
a fair hearing on the legality and propriety of applying the rule to the
particular case."' 7 Clearly, the rules will at least be regarded in the first
164. 48 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. B-2 (June 12, 1962).
165. Commissioner Elman, however, questions the legality of issuing these opinions,
feeling the procedure precludes the FTC from taking action whenever required by the
law and the public interest. 44 BNA ANTTRUST & TRADE REG. REP. A-19 (May 15,

1962).

166. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.62, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962). This procedure is
supplementary to the voluntary compliance program efforts under the trade practice
conference and guides procedures which are also directed at widespread problems.
167. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.63, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962). Determination of
whether the rules will have substantive or interpretive effect is beyond the scope of this
note. It will be presumed that the rules are procedural or evidentiary, similar to those
discussed in FTC v. Manco Watch Strap Co., 3 TRADE REG. REtP. 1115781 (1962).
The dilemma on this point is pointed up by Chairman Dixon's apparently contradictory statements. In one instance he represented that the rules "would not be law, but
the Commission would not need to parade all the evidence necessary to establish that the

SYMPOSIUM

instance as valid, and as contrasted with guides and trade practice conference rules, would after full hearing and judicial review in a particular
proceeding be regarded as binding until reopened." 8
1. Procedure. Rulemaking proceedings may be initiated by the
Commission or by petition of any interested party. 9 Notice of the nature of proposed rules is published in the Federal Register, together with
information as to when and how interested parties may present their
views.1 7 At any time the Commission can order investigations, studies,
or conferences deemed necessary for preparation of rules.' 7 Following
a thorough analysis of the legal and economic factors of the problem in
volved, tentative rules will be published. 2 Final rules will be promulgated by the Commission after consideration of any views submitted and
after reconsideration of matters of fact, law, and policy.'
Any interested party may petition for suspension or amendment of rules, though
no pending FTC action will be affected therebyY"
2. Effectiveness of the Trade Regulation Rule (TRR). At this
writing it is difficult to determine how extensively the TRR procedure
will be used. To date the FTC has not stated the extent to which trade
regulation rules will be applied.'
Whereas formulation of rules in
70
areas where illegal acts can be precisely defined will be relatively easy,
e.g., in relation to false and misleading advertising, in the area of antipractice was illegal." See address by Chairman Dixon, op. cit. supra note 155, p. 10. On
the other hand he has remarked that:
Specifically authorized by Section 6(g) of the FTC Act, rules and regulations
having the force and effect of law could be of substantial benefit. . . . These
rules would be in contrast to the advisory interpretations contained in trade
practice conference rule and industry guides.
5 TRADE REG. REP. 1 50122 (Feb. 13, 1962). But it is likely that these rules will have
only evidentiary value. FTC News Release, May 15, 1962. See Skidmore v. Swift &
Co,. 323 U.S. 134 (1944); American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 299 U.S. 232

(1936) ; DAvis,
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§ 5.03 (1951).

168. The FTC would be relieved of the burden of proving repeatedly that a particular practice is unlawful. FTC News Release, May 15, 1962. For instance, in the
Manco case, the FTC announced a rule of evidence that consumers prefer American
products over foreign. FTC v. Manco Watch Strap Co., supra note 167. A matter of
this kind could properly be made the subject of trade regulation rule.
169. FTC Rules of Practice § 1.65, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611 (1962).
170. Id. § 1.66.
171. Id. § 1.64.
172. Id. at 4611-12 §§ 1.61, 1.68.
173. Id. at 4612 §§ 1.68-1.70.
174. Id. at 4612 § 1.171.
175. The FTC has initiated rulemaking proceedings for sewing machine and sleeping bag advertisements. FTC Rules of Practice §§ 1.61-1.69, 27 Fed. Reg. 4611-12
(1962). Previous attempts by the FTC to eradicate widespread unlawful practice by
issuance of cease and desist orders to individual sleeping bag makers failed to deter
other members of the industry. Wal Street Journal, Feb. 20, 1963, p. 8, col. 1.
176. Address by Commissioner MacInyre, before the National Congress of Petroleum Retailers, Inc., in Roanoke, Va., Aug. 22, 1962.
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trust law or other complex areas extreme care must be exercised to avoid
prescribing uniform regulations where competitive pricing or other practices are not subject to uniform treatment. 77 It appears that the TRR
may well be limited to those narrowly defined practices which the FTC
7
has reason to believe are in violation of law. 1
Promulgation of trade regulation rules will serve to warn or advise
the businessman of practices which are deemed unlawful.'
Rules will
probably be focused on selected, specific competitive problems which are
prevalent in an industry, and will not be mere generalized restatements
of the law.'
Therefore, the FTC's attention in the rulemaking process
will be necessarily directed at an analysis indepth of underlying problems, rather than to symptoms. Designed in this way, the rules will be
an effective means to gain compliance on a widespread basis and will be
especially helpful where the guides or trade practice conference rules
have not adequately corrected an unlawful act or practice.
Although the trade regulation rule procedure will raise the level of
enforcement, its ultimate effectiveness may be hampered by a severe
shortage of personnel assigned to the Division of General Rules and
Regulations Applicable to Unlawful Trade Practices.'
Even careful
coordination with other bureaus and agencies will not permit a small
staff to function properly. Rectification of this condition should receive the FTC's early attention.
E. Voluntary Compliance Program-Citique. An adequate appraisal
of the voluntary compliance program is difficult, for most of the procedures are of recent origin and no comprehensive, factual study of the
enforcement program has ever been completed. Nevertheless, certain
177. Some have considered the industrywide approach a dangerous procedure for
antitrust. Authority to issue quasi-legislation rules for competitive pricing has been
doubted, and fear of FTC control of pricing has been expressed as follows: "Above all,
industry-wide treatment of individual pricing practices would further subordinate antitrust prohibition to administrative price regulation, and could foster a creeping cartelism
under a later-day N.R.A." Rowe, Antitrust and New Controls for Competitive Pricing
CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYmP. 64, 70 (1962).
178. The FTC's power to limit the application of trade regulation rules to specific
classes of seemingly comparable companies has been seriously questioned. See address
by Commissioner Maclntyre, op. cit. supra note 176. Naturally, the FTC will need to
exercise extreme care in determining whether a practice is simply vigorous competition
or injurious competition which suppresses the competitors and customers of the actor.
179. Hopefully the procedure will induce businessmen and their counsel to assist
the FTC in uncovering the relevant facts when a particular practice is being examined.
49 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE RtG. REP. B-3 (June 19, 1962).
180. See address by Chairman Dixon, before Section of Antitrust Law, American
Bar Association, in San Francisco, Cal., Aug. 6, 1962; address by Commissioner MacIntyre, before the Winter Conference of the American Marketing Association in New
York, N.Y., Dec. 27, 1961; FTC News Release, May 15, 1962.
181. Interviews.
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general conclusions can be drawn from a careful review of the FTC's
activity.
An efficient and thriving voluntary compliance program can be developed from the compliance measures now utilized by the FTC. Only
changes in emphasis and internal management seem necessary to full
realization of the potential of the voluntary and informational methods.
The trade practice conference rules program appears to be of diminishing value; yet it should be employed where there are numerous problems
peculiar to an industry. The continued use of the guides approach,
wherever possible, is to be encouraged. Techniques perfected under this
program in 1960 are particularly noteworthy. Doubt overshadows the
utility of the advisory opinion procedure, unless its use is strictly and
carefully limited to requests involving minor problems. The other new
procedure, trade regulation rules, may eventually so fully develop as
largely to replace the voluntary methods, but cautious and gradual development by the FTC is anticipated and desirable. In summary the
means of compliance, other than enforcement proceedings, now available
to the FTC are sufficient to invoke effectively the corrective forces of
official guidance, public opinion, and business discretion.
IV.

NEED FOR ADEQUATE STAFFING AND PLANNING

Regardless of the inventiveness of the FTC in drafting rules and
procedures to carry out its voluntary compliance program, at least partial
failure is unavoidable in the absence of comprehensive planning and adequate staffing. There are no substitutes for these indispensable requirements of a meaningful program of guidance.
A. Plaming.
1. Overall Planning. From time to time the Commission has delegated the duty of overall planning. In 1950 it reactivated the Central
Planning Council which was to recommend an annual program and
evaluate progress under such programs." 2 While the FTC stated that
the Council was achieving some measure of success, nonetheless the
Council was deactivated in 1954 without any published evidence of accomplishment." 3 From that date until 1961 the Commission members
performed such planning functions as were carried out, but adjudication
and other administrative duties demanded such extensive amounts of the
Commission's time that planning was nearly on an ad hoc basis." 4
182. Heads of the various FTC bureaus were the principal members.
ANN. REP. 8.
183. Note, 62 COLUi. L. REv. 671, 702 (1962).
184. LANDIs REP. 22.

1952 FTC
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To remedy this serious deficiency a Program Review Director was
appointed in 1961 to study the economy, select the major problem areas,
and prepare plans calculated to resolve the problems."' s He reports
directly to the Commission,"' and, apparently, is free to function independently and to use flexible procedures and approaches in formulating appropriate plans. To date there is no evidence of the success or
failure of this method of planning. However, several points cast doubt
upon the effectiveness of the director approach to FTC planning.
First of all, the director, by himself, would be incapable of accomplishing such a tremendous and vital task as overall planning. But he
has not been given authority commensurate with his responsibility to
obtain the necessary assistance of the offices and bureaus of the FTC." 7
Nor is it at all clear that the units of the FTC are adequately aware of
the perplexing situation which faces the director."' 8 Realistically, the
director will be hard pressed to develop any sort of workable and
imaginative program of enforcement.
Instead the FTC might consider three alternatives: (1) establishing an office with authority to request advice and assistance from all
other bureaus and offices; (2) transferring the functions of the Program Review Director to the Executive Director of the FTC and appointing an advisory committee made up of representatives from all bureaus and offices concerned with the enforcement program; (3) transferring the functions of the Program Review Director to a division
created under the Bureau of Economics and empowering it to obtain
advice and assistance from all other bureaus and offices. Each alternative approach could be shaped to meet the principal deficiencies and would
facilitate the FTC's commendable effort to strengthen its long-range
planning program.
Additionally, the Program Review Director or his substitute should
be given the responsibility for reviewing annually the FTC's activities
and reporting the extent to which the planned objectives have been met.
In this way a continuing check would be made on the progress of the
enforcement program.
2. Economic surveillance. Generally, underlying the FTC's policy
and planning decisions must be an understanding of the structure and
performance of the economy. The Hoover Report stated this prerequisite forcefully:
185.

BNA ANimusT & TRADE REG. REP. A-10 (Oct. 17, 1961).

186. FTC Rule of Practice, Procedures and Organization, Statement of Organization § 4(a) (June, 1962), on file in the FTC Library.
187. Interviews.
188. Ibid.
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There is a need for an economic staff systematically surveying
our economy; probing for industrial and economic practices
which threaten the elimination of competitive conditions; identifying restrictive tendencies before they become too solidly
entrenched; analyzing the basic disorders found and formulating methods for their practical correction. Such a procedure
gives the policy of the statutes continuous vitality in terms of
current conditions. It also places stress on the basic purpose
of the legislation-the practical correction of trade practices
to bring them in conformity with the public interest. These are
the basic purposes of the Federal Trade Commission." 9
In this area of economic reporting the FTC's efforts have been disappointing. 9 ' The tendency in recent years has been to emphasize litigation and to post an impressive adjudicatory record. Compared with
the earlier years of the FTC's existence, the past decade has been one
of diminished economic reporting-that is, the FTC has been seemingly
content not to focus sharply upon economic disorders and their remedies.' 9' Further, while the 1958 antibiotics industry report'9 . and the
current study of integration and concentration in retailing,' 9 ' as well as
the other economic reports made in the past forty-nine years, are in
general of unquestionable value, the discouraging factor is that they are
generally not focused upon the FTC's program and that despite these efforts relatively less may now be known of economic conditions than was
known in 1914.94
Until quite recently comparatively less was spent for operation of
the Bureau of Economics than was expended on the average in the first
189. HoovER REP. 124. Others, including the Director of the Bureau of Economics
of the FTC, acknowledge this important basic role. Mueller, The Role of Economics in
Antitr st Enforcement at the Federal Trade Commission, 20 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION
REP. 20 (1962) ; KAYSER & TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 44, 45 (1959) ; Howrey, Revalation; of Comndssioi s Responsibilities, 3 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION REP. 29 (1953);
59 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REc. REP. A-4 (Aug. 28, 1962); 12 BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. A-1 (Oct. 3, 1961).

190. HoovER REP. 125.
191. HoovER RE,. 128; see 1918-1961 FTC ANN. REP. for a clearer picture of the
relative activity of the Bureau of Economics since the origin of the FTC. As an indication of the nature and scope of the FTC investigations conducted since 1915 see 1961
FTC ANN. REP. 115-39.
192. 1958 FTC ANN. REP. 6.
193. 1961 FTC ANN. REP. 69; 1960 FTC ANN. REP,. 95; 1959 FTC ANN. REP. 81;
FTC News Summary No. 46, Aug. 4, 1961, p. 3, col. 1. For a general discussion of
this report see address by Kintner, before the Annual Convention of the National Frozen

Food Association, New York, N.Y., Oct. 23, 1960.
194. The principal reasons for this are twofold: (1) an increase in the complexity of the economic structure; (2) a decrease in the resources applied to economic
studies. See Mueller, supra note 189, at 25.
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ten years of the FTC's history. 9 ' Even now after adjustments for devaluation of the dollar and changes in functions, the average budget allocation to the bureau is no greater than in the 1920's.'
Additionally,
from 1924-1930, the FTC employed an average of thirty-three economists, equalling ten percent of its staff.'97 Between 1937 and 1951 the
economists never constituted more than three percent of the staff,' and
today the forty economists devoted to the FTC's research and enforcement program total less than four percent of the staff."' 9 These facts-a
relatively small appropriation and economic staff-coupled with the
rapidly changing and complex nature of our economy, partially explain
the present need for broadly gauged studies of the economy.
Clearly, the FTC is renewing its efforts in this area, for the manpower and funds for the staff are being increased substantially, within
the limits of budget appropriations."' It can be expected that the ex195.
Table of Expemitures for the Bureau of Econwmics*
EXPENDITURES
EXPENDITURES
Bureau of
Bureau of
Year
Economlcs
Total for FTC
Year
Economics
Total for FTC
1918
$934,410
$1,423,394
1930
$544,457
$1,453,004
1919
923,958
1,543,894
1935
425,700
1,917,310
1920
441,040
964,735
1940
268,202
2,192,082
1921
338,147
924,680
1945
122,326
1,953,783
1922
300,518
887,753
1950
234,174
3,722,792
1923
268,702
939,813
1955
275,210
4,126,281
1924
207,498
920,963
1956
314,736
4,547,163
1925
263,036
1,015,250
1957
514,650
5,516,423
1926
231,796
988,023
1958
546,530
6,185,048
1927
299,986
960,006
1959
548,497
6,484,168
1928
249,124
966,391
1960
586,600
6,839,500
1929
360,509
1,152,542
1961
616,604
8,003,124
* No adjustments have been made for changes in dollar valuation, functions of the
Bureau, or special appropriations. All figures are compiled from the FTC Annual
Reports.
196. Ibid.
197. 1951 FTC ANN. REP. 31.
198. Ibid.
199. At present about 14 economists are engaged in preparing economic reports.
Letter from Willard E. Mueller, Director, Bureau of Economics, to the Indiana Law
Journal, Nov. 14, 1962.
200. 2 BNA ANTITRUST & TRADn RaG. RaP. B-4 (July 25, 1961) ; Hearings on ReorganizationPlanis Nos. I, 2, 3, & 4 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on
Government Operations, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 50 (1961). While a past Commissioner
has expressed the belief that the Bureau of Economics should be expanded five or six
times, a similar viewpoint seems to be held by current Commission members. Zealous
Men of the FTC, Fortune, Feb., 1952, p. 140; address by Commissioner Elman, before
the First American Corporate Counsel Institute, Chicago, Ill., Oct. 11, 1962, p. 5.
Indicative of the FTC's concern is the 1962 recruitment program for the Bureau of
Economics. Individuals with graduate training in industrial organization have been
sought, and about ten of the bureau's members hired within the past year have received
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panded economic reporting will aid in selection and elimination of trouble
spots by enabling the FTC to better gear its attack to major and industrywide problems. Thus, greater "coalescence of legal and economic concepts of competition and monopoly" will equip the FTC to assume its
positive and preventive statutory role.201
B. Personnel. A basic reason for the creation of the FTC was the
belief that a body of experts could more practically enforce the antitrust
and trade regulation statutes.0 2 Yet, most critics and committees evaluating the FTC severely criticize its lack of expertise at all levels. 03 In
fact, both the present and last preceding chairmen have expressed deep
concern over this problem. 04
The solution to this staffing weakness is difficult to determine, but
the symptoms are fairly evident. First of all, the turnover rate has been
exceptionally high, especially among younger employees. 0-3 A congressional study showed that between 1949 and 1959 separations of the
FTC's staff for all reasons exceeded an annual rate of twenty-five percent. 00 Secondly, the FTC has been subject to internal strife, particuor are working towarl a Ph.D. in this area. See letter from Mueller, op. cit. supra note

199.
201.

See Howrey, supra note 189, at 33.

202.

STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, HOUSE COMM.
ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., STAFF REP. ON INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS

203.

7 (Subcommittee Print 1960).

See, e.g., HOOVER REP. 10-15; Preliminary Rep. 18; Connor, FTC Procedure

Revisions: A Critique, 7 VILL. L. REV. 359, 361 (1962).
204. Chairman Kintner recognized that "there were significant areas of weakness."
Kintner, The FTC in ig6o-Apologia Pro Vita Nostra, CCH ANTITRUST LAW SYMP. 21,
24 (1961). Chairman Dixon sees the "need to raise our sights" with respect to staffing.
1962 Hearings 978.
205. 1962 Hearings 961.

206.

Table of Staff Turnover

Year

Accessions

1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959

88
89
251
68
56
88
109
203
135
81
113

All Separations Monthly TurnoverRate

85
93
135
167
113
66
82
95
114
75
90

1.08
1.06
1.64
2.07
1.46
.92
1.17
1.25
1.29
.81
1.21

STAFF OF SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT, HOUSE CoM-M. ON INTERSTATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS., INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS, COMPARATIVE OPERATING DATA FOR YEARS 1949 AND 1959 94 (Subcommittee Print

1960).
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larly when undergoing reorganization." 7 Thirdly, passiveness may arise
among the older staff members."'
To rectify this situation programs for better selection and retention
of employees need to be established. Political allegiance or similarly irrelevant criteria have no place in the selection process."' Rather, experience, ability and devotion to the public interest should be primarily
considered. Continued use of the Honors Program, where higher
salaries are offered to outstanding law graduates, and of the Summer
Intern Program, should raise the level of the younger attorney staff
members,2 10 and comparable programs could well be developed for positions demanding more experience. In order to retain competent employees several approaches may be useful: (1) giving the chairman or
his designate discretionary power to increase an employee's compensation
for meritorious service;211 (2) providing additional employee benefits;12 (3) encouraging more inter- and intra-agency transfers even at
the cost of some apparent decrease in efficiency; (4) promotions based
primarily on achievement and skill; (5) delegation of as much authority
as feasible to retain employee interest; (6) increasing staff educational
services; and, of course, (7) increasing salaries.
In the final analysis staffing will always be the keystone to the success of the administrative method, for the "most dismal failure, the most
vexing problem, and yet the greatest hope of the administrative process
is men."21
V.

CONCLUSION

Undeniably the goal of the overall enforcement program of the FTC
is to maximize compliance with the laws under its jurisdiction. While
increases in money and manpower or realignments in organization have
207. For example, cliques were reportedly formed for purposes of assignment and
promotion. Preliminary Rep. 18. Hostility resulted from promotion policies which too
frequently were based on tenure. HoovER REP. 127. Staff members assigned to the
mandatory and voluntary enforcement bureaus were frequently at odds, and a continual
conflict between the lawyers and the economists existed. Preliminary Rep. 18; Note, 62
YALE L.J. 912, 937 (1953) ; Interviews.
208. PreliminaryRep. 18; see Note, supra note 183, at 671 n. 216.
209. It has been suggested that the agencies have used these criteria. LANDIS REP.
22.
210. 1960 FTC ANN. REP. 23.
211. For a discussion of the merits of a legislative proposal along these lines see
8 FED. B. NEws 206-08 (1961) ; Hearhqs on Salaries of Attorneys in the Department of
Justice Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee On the Judiciary, 87th Cong.,

1st Sess., ser. 4, at 1-17 (1961).
212. Chairman Dixon has discussed the importance of such a proposal.

1962

Hearings 961.
213. Kintner, Federal Administrative Law in the Decade of the Sixties, 47 A.B.A.J.

269, 272 (1961).
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contributed to the achievement of this goal, they have certainly not provided a final answer to the enforcement problem. Instead, a meaningful
program of compliance is unalterably tied to adequate planning and
staffing, and in terms of the enforcement goal of the FTC, the most
important objective of a compliance program is concentration on selection of matters of genuine public significance and avoidance of matters
of minimal concern.
But even though the FTC were to exercise remarkable judgment in
the selection process, it would still be faced with an enormous administrative burden in order to fulfill its statutory mandate. For this reason
alone, too extensive reliance upon mandatory procedure would seem to
doom any overall compliance program to failure.214 Therefore, the FTC
is compelled to seek the cooperation of business and the public. This
type of program, however, is a proper and intended one for an administrative agency.15 The FTC was formed to guide the businessman, to
help clarify the law, and to set standards within the framework of the
applicable statutes. Consequently, the FTC frequently has been admonished to induce the cooperative efforts of private forces in the
economy ;211 compliance techniques like those developed under the guides
program are peculiarly suited to this end.
In effect the voluntary and mandatory aspects of the overall guidance program are complementary. Where cooperative methods fail to
produce adequate compliance, invocation of mandatory procedures is
vital to protection of good-faith adherents to the rules. Further, utilization of voluntary procedures whenever possible will permit the mandatory arm of the FTC to focus on problems which can be resolved only
through the regular adjudicative process.
Thus, contrary to the sometimes expressed view, the FTC must be
both "governess and policeman" if it is to realize its goal.21 7 And, so
long as the FTC strives to formulate a well-balanced enforcement program geared to its capacity, the prospects for its realization of the full
potential of the administrative process seem much brighter.
214. For instance, the trade court proposal has been rejected. See the following
for excellent pro and con discussions: Maclntyre, Administrative Court Proposal, 29
J.B.A. OF D.C. 316 (1962) ; Berger, A Reply to Commissioner Maclntyre's Attack on
the Trade Court Proposal,29 J.B.A. OF D.C. 337 (1962); Handler, Some Unresolved
Problems of Antitrust, 62 COLUm. L. REv. 930 (1962) ; Kintner, The Trade Court Proposal: An. Examination of Some Possible Defects, 44 A.B.A.J. 441 (1958).
215. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATIV LAw TEXT (1951).
216. See, e.g., LANDIs REP. 57.
217. Address by Austern, op. cit. supra note 144, p. 19.

